1. You wrote: “Indeed, given the initial passage, I don’t think that Malpass’s interpretation is implausible.” Your assertion does “nothing” to refute my point that Malpass’ objection commits a strawman fallacy: his objection is based on his claim that I was talking about ‘nothing’ as a container, but my initial passage does not imply this.
2. You wrote: “sometimes we use ‘potential’ to speak about possibilities.” Indeed. Given that non-being means the absence of anything, which implies the absence of potential=metaphysical possibility for anything, and given that for any event E to happen there must at least be a metaphysical possibility of E happening, these imply that “If the potential=metaphysical possibility for the event ‘x begins to exist’ is absent, the event ‘x begins to exist’ cannot happen.” The consequent follows from the meaning of the antecedent statements. There is no circularity in the argument, since the argument is not based on assuming that the causal principle is true (which would be circular). Rather, it is based on the meaning and implication of the concept of ‘non-being’.
3. “We might think of “coming from” as efficient causation.” Indeed.
The above three points answered all your objections in this post. Let me know if you have any further objections.
1. That remark wasn't meant to "refute your point that Malpass's objection commits a strawman fallacy". All I was saying was that his interpretation wasn't implausible given your remarks. To be honest, I probably would have interpreted you as saying something like that as well.
2. It turns out that my interpretation of your argument, on the modal reading of "potential", is basically correct. However, what you say effectively in support of (5) of my reconstruction does not make sense. Given that you're using "non-being" in a quantificational sense (and "came from" in a causal sense), to say that "x beginning to exist came from non-being" is just to say that x began to exist without a cause. All this entails about the possibility that <x begins to exist without a cause> is that that possibility is not part of the causal antecedents of x beginning to exist. It does not at all entail that it isn't possible that x begin to exist without a cause. In order to infer that consequence, you still need the causal principle, or something near enough. Accordingly, my central concern for your argument remains appropriate.
I probably will not address any further responses, unless you provide a clear argument worth considering.
(1) Ok, so you concede that the main argument in my video (that Malpass's objection commits a strawman fallacy and does nothing to refute my argument from the concept of non-being) remains unrefuted. And you have not yet offered any reason why my initial remarks would make it plausible to think that I was talking about ‘nothing’ as a container (as Malpass interpreted).
(2) You wrote “to say that "x beginning to exist came from non-being" is just to say that x began to exist without a cause. All this entails about the possibility that <x begins to exist without a cause> is that that possibility is not part of the causal antecedents of x beginning to exist.” What you wrote is false because merely to say that x began to exist without a cause does not entail anything about the possibility that<x begins to exist without a cause>, and it does not address the clear argument which I have already provided. To put it in syllogistic form:
1.Non-being= the absence of anything
2. The absence of anything implies the absence of potential=metaphysical possibility for anything. [From 1].
3. For any event E to happen, there must at least be a metaphysical possibility of E happening.
4. If the potential=metaphysical possibility for the event ‘(whatever) x begins to exist’ is absent, the event ‘x begins to exist’ cannot happen. [From 2 and 3].
From the above 4 points (which is what I have written in my previous post), it follows that
5. Therefore, ‘(whatever) x begins to exist’ requires the presence of something C that grounds its metaphysical possibility (C is what I mean by a cause), given that metaphysical possibilities must be grounded in something actual.
6. Therefore, whatever begins to exist has a cause. (Causal Principle).
There is no circularity in the argument, since the argument is not based on assuming that the causal principle is true, but based on premises 1 to 4. Thus your objection "In order to infer that consequence, you still need the causal principle, or something near enough" is false.
I told myself that I wouldn't address further replies like this, but I can't help myself. You've simply rewritten the same inference without fixing or addressing the central problem. While 'non-being' as used does mean the 'absence of anything', the overall expression 'x came from non-being' restricts the relevant quantifier domain to the causal antecedents of x. So, when we say that "x came from non-being", we are saying that there isn't anything in the aforementioned domain. Thus, in (2), all you can say is that there isn't anything - including potentials and possibilities - in that domain. That does not entail that there isn't anything simpliciter, or that there aren't any potentials/possibilities, since that would be to confuse the relevant restricted quantifier domain for the universal one (or, at least, a broader one).
I will add that I don't think that 'possibilities' are even things per se, let alone things that might stand in causal relations. For example, even if there are no things at all (the empty world), there would still be possibilities true at that world. Thus, even if we incorrectly take a broader domain when talking about "x coming from non-being" here, it does not follow that it wouldn't be possible that x begins to exist without a cause. However, since your domain error remains regardless, broader issues concerning modality and the ontology and causal relevance of possibilities are irrelevant to the point.
As if that wasn't enough, premise (5) is extremely puzzling. Not only is it plainly not a consequence of (1)-(4), it makes very controversial assumptions about metaphysical possibility. First, it assumes that all metaphysical possibilities are grounded in things that are actual. Second, it assumes that the metaphysical possibility of x beginning to exist must be grounded in some cause. Neither of those assumptions follow from (1)-(4), and I think that both are obviously false. However, I'm not interested in exploring that here, in large part because the second assumption is essentially just another unargued assertion of the causal principle, or something near enough.
It is up to you whether you would like to comment further. But let me make the following two points clear to interested readers who have been following our exchange.
1. Despite claiming its plausibility, you have failed to defend the plausibility of Malpass’ (mis- ) interpretation of my argument. My video response to Malpass's objection stands unrefuted: his objection does NOTHING to rebut my argument from the concept of NON-BEING for the Causal Principle.
2. You claim that in (2) all you can say is that there isn't anything - including potentials and possibilities - in that domain “to the causal antecedents of x.” ‘That does not entail that there isn't anything simpliciter, or that there aren't any potentials/possibilities.’
*However, if there are any potentials/metaphysical possibilities, these would need to be relevant to the beginning of x. (2) is saying there aren't any such potentials/metaphysical possibilities.
You wrote ‘I don't think that 'possibilities' are even things per se, let alone things that might stand in causal relations.’
*However, I am not assuming that ‘possibilities’ are things standing in causal relations, rather, what I said is that metaphysical possibilities for the beginning of x need to be grounded in something C that stands in causal relation to x.
You wrote ‘even if there are no things at all (the empty world), there would still be possibilities true at that world.’
*There would be logical possibilities about that world, but not metaphysical possibilities for the beginning of x (see below).
You wrote that my argument ‘assumes that all metaphysical possibilities are grounded in things that are actual. Second, it assumes that the metaphysical possibility of x beginning to exist must be grounded in some cause. Neither of those assumptions follow from (1)-(4), and I think that both are obviously false.’
*As your atheist friend Graham Oppy explains, ‘[metaphysically] possible worlds are alternative ways that the actual world could have gone, or could go, or could one day go’ (Oppy, 2013, p. 47). Thus, it is true that metaphysical possibilities are grounded in things that are actual. Metaphysical possibility refers to what could exist or occur, given the nature of the actual world. It’s broader than physical possibility (what’s possible given the laws of physics), but narrower than logical possibility (what’s possible without contradiction). Your friends Schmid and Malpass (2023, p. 1) explain that ‘every [metaphysical] possible world shares an initial history with the actual world and diverges only because causal powers (or dispositions, or some such) are differentially exercised.’ In other words, the metaphysical possibilities are grounded in causes (I understand ‘cause’ broadly to include causal powers, dispositions, or some such, i.e. anything that is required for the effect to occur). Given that the two assumptions are true, the conclusion of my argument that the causal principle is true follows from (1)-(4).
1. You wrote: “Indeed, given the initial passage, I don’t think that Malpass’s interpretation is implausible.” Your assertion does “nothing” to refute my point that Malpass’ objection commits a strawman fallacy: his objection is based on his claim that I was talking about ‘nothing’ as a container, but my initial passage does not imply this.
2. You wrote: “sometimes we use ‘potential’ to speak about possibilities.” Indeed. Given that non-being means the absence of anything, which implies the absence of potential=metaphysical possibility for anything, and given that for any event E to happen there must at least be a metaphysical possibility of E happening, these imply that “If the potential=metaphysical possibility for the event ‘x begins to exist’ is absent, the event ‘x begins to exist’ cannot happen.” The consequent follows from the meaning of the antecedent statements. There is no circularity in the argument, since the argument is not based on assuming that the causal principle is true (which would be circular). Rather, it is based on the meaning and implication of the concept of ‘non-being’.
3. “We might think of “coming from” as efficient causation.” Indeed.
The above three points answered all your objections in this post. Let me know if you have any further objections.
1. That remark wasn't meant to "refute your point that Malpass's objection commits a strawman fallacy". All I was saying was that his interpretation wasn't implausible given your remarks. To be honest, I probably would have interpreted you as saying something like that as well.
2. It turns out that my interpretation of your argument, on the modal reading of "potential", is basically correct. However, what you say effectively in support of (5) of my reconstruction does not make sense. Given that you're using "non-being" in a quantificational sense (and "came from" in a causal sense), to say that "x beginning to exist came from non-being" is just to say that x began to exist without a cause. All this entails about the possibility that <x begins to exist without a cause> is that that possibility is not part of the causal antecedents of x beginning to exist. It does not at all entail that it isn't possible that x begin to exist without a cause. In order to infer that consequence, you still need the causal principle, or something near enough. Accordingly, my central concern for your argument remains appropriate.
I probably will not address any further responses, unless you provide a clear argument worth considering.
(1) Ok, so you concede that the main argument in my video (that Malpass's objection commits a strawman fallacy and does nothing to refute my argument from the concept of non-being) remains unrefuted. And you have not yet offered any reason why my initial remarks would make it plausible to think that I was talking about ‘nothing’ as a container (as Malpass interpreted).
(2) You wrote “to say that "x beginning to exist came from non-being" is just to say that x began to exist without a cause. All this entails about the possibility that <x begins to exist without a cause> is that that possibility is not part of the causal antecedents of x beginning to exist.” What you wrote is false because merely to say that x began to exist without a cause does not entail anything about the possibility that<x begins to exist without a cause>, and it does not address the clear argument which I have already provided. To put it in syllogistic form:
1.Non-being= the absence of anything
2. The absence of anything implies the absence of potential=metaphysical possibility for anything. [From 1].
3. For any event E to happen, there must at least be a metaphysical possibility of E happening.
4. If the potential=metaphysical possibility for the event ‘(whatever) x begins to exist’ is absent, the event ‘x begins to exist’ cannot happen. [From 2 and 3].
From the above 4 points (which is what I have written in my previous post), it follows that
5. Therefore, ‘(whatever) x begins to exist’ requires the presence of something C that grounds its metaphysical possibility (C is what I mean by a cause), given that metaphysical possibilities must be grounded in something actual.
6. Therefore, whatever begins to exist has a cause. (Causal Principle).
There is no circularity in the argument, since the argument is not based on assuming that the causal principle is true, but based on premises 1 to 4. Thus your objection "In order to infer that consequence, you still need the causal principle, or something near enough" is false.
I told myself that I wouldn't address further replies like this, but I can't help myself. You've simply rewritten the same inference without fixing or addressing the central problem. While 'non-being' as used does mean the 'absence of anything', the overall expression 'x came from non-being' restricts the relevant quantifier domain to the causal antecedents of x. So, when we say that "x came from non-being", we are saying that there isn't anything in the aforementioned domain. Thus, in (2), all you can say is that there isn't anything - including potentials and possibilities - in that domain. That does not entail that there isn't anything simpliciter, or that there aren't any potentials/possibilities, since that would be to confuse the relevant restricted quantifier domain for the universal one (or, at least, a broader one).
I will add that I don't think that 'possibilities' are even things per se, let alone things that might stand in causal relations. For example, even if there are no things at all (the empty world), there would still be possibilities true at that world. Thus, even if we incorrectly take a broader domain when talking about "x coming from non-being" here, it does not follow that it wouldn't be possible that x begins to exist without a cause. However, since your domain error remains regardless, broader issues concerning modality and the ontology and causal relevance of possibilities are irrelevant to the point.
As if that wasn't enough, premise (5) is extremely puzzling. Not only is it plainly not a consequence of (1)-(4), it makes very controversial assumptions about metaphysical possibility. First, it assumes that all metaphysical possibilities are grounded in things that are actual. Second, it assumes that the metaphysical possibility of x beginning to exist must be grounded in some cause. Neither of those assumptions follow from (1)-(4), and I think that both are obviously false. However, I'm not interested in exploring that here, in large part because the second assumption is essentially just another unargued assertion of the causal principle, or something near enough.
This will be my last comment on the matter.
It is up to you whether you would like to comment further. But let me make the following two points clear to interested readers who have been following our exchange.
1. Despite claiming its plausibility, you have failed to defend the plausibility of Malpass’ (mis- ) interpretation of my argument. My video response to Malpass's objection stands unrefuted: his objection does NOTHING to rebut my argument from the concept of NON-BEING for the Causal Principle.
2. You claim that in (2) all you can say is that there isn't anything - including potentials and possibilities - in that domain “to the causal antecedents of x.” ‘That does not entail that there isn't anything simpliciter, or that there aren't any potentials/possibilities.’
*However, if there are any potentials/metaphysical possibilities, these would need to be relevant to the beginning of x. (2) is saying there aren't any such potentials/metaphysical possibilities.
You wrote ‘I don't think that 'possibilities' are even things per se, let alone things that might stand in causal relations.’
*However, I am not assuming that ‘possibilities’ are things standing in causal relations, rather, what I said is that metaphysical possibilities for the beginning of x need to be grounded in something C that stands in causal relation to x.
You wrote ‘even if there are no things at all (the empty world), there would still be possibilities true at that world.’
*There would be logical possibilities about that world, but not metaphysical possibilities for the beginning of x (see below).
You wrote that my argument ‘assumes that all metaphysical possibilities are grounded in things that are actual. Second, it assumes that the metaphysical possibility of x beginning to exist must be grounded in some cause. Neither of those assumptions follow from (1)-(4), and I think that both are obviously false.’
*As your atheist friend Graham Oppy explains, ‘[metaphysically] possible worlds are alternative ways that the actual world could have gone, or could go, or could one day go’ (Oppy, 2013, p. 47). Thus, it is true that metaphysical possibilities are grounded in things that are actual. Metaphysical possibility refers to what could exist or occur, given the nature of the actual world. It’s broader than physical possibility (what’s possible given the laws of physics), but narrower than logical possibility (what’s possible without contradiction). Your friends Schmid and Malpass (2023, p. 1) explain that ‘every [metaphysical] possible world shares an initial history with the actual world and diverges only because causal powers (or dispositions, or some such) are differentially exercised.’ In other words, the metaphysical possibilities are grounded in causes (I understand ‘cause’ broadly to include causal powers, dispositions, or some such, i.e. anything that is required for the effect to occur). Given that the two assumptions are true, the conclusion of my argument that the causal principle is true follows from (1)-(4).
Loke's argument seems circular (or something near enough).